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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the  ways in which using the World 
Wide  Web  to  promote  transparency  and  to  disseminate 
open  data  will  affect  warranted  and  unwarranted  trust  in 
politics and within societies. It is argued that transparency 
and open data will be damaging for unwarranted trust, but 
this  will open  up a space for  warranted trust to flourish. 
Three types of theory about trust and decision-making in 
politics are discussed: social capital theories, rational choice 
theories and deliberative democracy theories. Using the UK 
government’s  transparency  programme  in  crime  and 
criminal justice as an example, it is argued that mechanisms 
being pioneered to disseminate open data online, such as 
sites like data.gov and data.gov.uk, promote trust on each 
theory,  although  the  supply  of  data  is  necessary  but  not 
sufficient.  It  is  also  necessary  to  consider  the  wider 
infosphere, putting deliberative processes in place to foster 
trust. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The  World  Wide  Web  has  enabled  one  of  the  most 
revolutionary changes in the practice of politics of recent 
years: the development of transparency and open data. Sites 
such as data.gov, data.gov.uk, datos.gob.es and data.gouv.fr 
now routinely publish data under very liberal licences. The 
involvement  of  major  figures  from  the  Web  community, 
such as Tim Berners-Lee and Nigel Shadbolt in the UK and 
James Hendler in the US, have helped raise the likelihood 
that open data will be reusable and linkable, and will make 
an important contribution to the Linked Data Web. 
However, we should not lose sight of the fact that the Web 
is a sociotechnical system, and that as well as improving the 
flow  and  quality  of  data,  and  pushing  to  ensure  that 
representational formats meet the exacting requirements of 
Berners-Lee’s 5* rating system,
1 there are also institutional 
and  process  changes  that  are  needed  to  ensure  that  open 
data  gets  used  productively,  and  enhances  the  political 
experience.  The  aim  must  be  to  develop  not  just  the 
technical infrastructure (important as that is), but also what 
Floridi has termed the whole infosphere [5], the complete 
information environment, of which the Web is an important 
but not exclusive part. 
In this paper, I will consider the issue of how open data and 
transparency can  help foster trust in politics. Trust is  far 
from being the only driver for transparency and open data 
programmes, but it is an important one, with resonance in 
many countries that have recently experienced scandal or 
corruption. 
As  a  matter  of  scope,  I  emphasise  that  this  paper  is  a 
normative analysis, driven by theories of democracy from 
political philosophy, and a sociological theory of trust. The 
outputs  of  the  paper  are  philosophical  (normative 
arguments for transparency policies, and for the democratic 
legitimacy of transparency) and practical (arguments about 
institutional design and risk management). The paper does 
not  contain  empirical  work  (e.g.  surveys  of  citizens), 
although  this  is  clearly  a  very  important  aspect  of 
establishing  and  retaining  legitimacy  of  transparency  in 
democracies, and such studies are an essential component 
of governments’ efforts to ensure and retain public trust in 
transparency. 
For the purposes of this short paper, I will not differentiate 
too much between transparency and open data, but the basic 
distinction is that transparency is the practice of being open 
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about government processes, while open data is the practice 
of  making  data  reusable  by  citizens  and/or  consumers. 
There is a large overlap between the two ideas, but they set 
different  requirements.  In  each  case  the  Web  is  a  vital 
delivery mechanism as it has the lowest barriers to entry, 
and so makes data from either agenda widely available. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I shall set out 
some basic ideas about trust in politics, and show how they 
relate at an abstract level to transparency and open data. 
Next, I shall set out an example from the UK government’s 
transparency programme, focusing on data about crime and 
criminal justice. The next three sections will consider how 
this  programme  measures  up  against  three  influential 
theories about trust in politics. A final discussion section 
considers lessons learned. 
KNOWLEDGE, TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY 
Trust and Trustworthiness 
Trust is a manifold concept [14], and generalisations about 
it are fraught with risk, as it ranges from the trust that a 
baby has for its mother, to the trust that a thief has for the 
fence  who  handles  his  stolen  goods.  Yet  trust  in  the 
political sphere does  have  some properties specific  to its 
context. Political relations are public, and often marked by 
conflict  over  resource  allocations.  Cooperation  often 
requires negotiation, and promises good payoffs as against 
risks of losses. Furthermore, many political issues impact 
on  deep  forces  such  as  personal  identify  and  group 
solidarity,  and  so  are  often  not  resolvable  via  shallow 
mechanisms such as game theory. 
In  political  circumstances  such  as  these,  trust  is  an 
important risk and complexity management tool [12]. If X 
trusts Y to some degree, then this means that X believes, to 
that degree, that Y is trustworthy. All things being equal, he 
will  be  willing  to  take  a  risk  of  a  certain  level  on  Y’s 
trustworthiness (i.e. Y being willing, able and motivated to 
behave as she claims she will). The stronger X’s trust, the 
higher the degree, and the greater the risk he is willing to 
take.  His  trust  may  be  supported  by  institutions,  which 
structure Y’s behaviour, provide behavioural templates and 
may also investigate, store or certify Y’s reputation, or by 
sanctions,  which  increase  the  incentives  for  Y  to  be 
trustworthy to the extent that they are practicable. 
If  X  trusts  Y,  he  saves  himself  the  costs  of  performing 
whatever task himself that he would like to outsource to Y; 
he can more easily accrue the benefits of cooperation in the 
absence of the costs of fraud; and he saves himself the costs 
of  monitoring and  micromanaging Y. Trust enables X to 
maximize the reach of his limited cognitive resources. X’s 
lifeworld becomes less complex because he can outsource 
some  of  his  interactions  to  Y,  while  he  is  also  more 
confident that he is minimising risk. 
Of course, we have to add the caveat that X’s trust needs to 
be  well-placed  –  i.e.  that  Y  is  trustworthy.  If  Y  is  not 
trustworthy  (or  worse,  untrustworthy),  then  greater  costs 
and complexity will accrue for X in the long run. If X’s 
trust is well-placed on the basis of relevant knowledge, then 
we can say his trust is warranted. If it is based on, say, a 
hunch, then it is unwarranted. If trust is unwarranted, that 
does not mean it is not well-placed, of course. Conversely, 
warranted trust is not always well-placed either (it merely 
states that it is rational to trust when trust is warranted). 
The role of knowledge in trust relations is important, in that 
it  lowers  risk,  uncertainty  and  complexity.  Hence 
transparency, which increases (access to) knowledge, has a 
role to play in trust relations. To take an obvious example 
on which I will expand later, if Y’s interests are transparent, 
X can  make a better judgment of how  well  her interests 
align with his own. As another example, if Y’s past actions 
are transparent, then X can make a better judgment of Y’s 
capabilities and how disposed she is to behave as she claims 
she will. 
Trust in Politics 
Although many have said that trust is a vital part of politics, 
there are conflicting theories about the role it plays. Some 
authors,  e.g.  Francis  Fukuyama,  [6]  have  erroneously 
argued that we need a high-trust society to be economically 
successful. That this is false is easily seen: what we need is 
a  high-trustworthiness  society  in  which  trust  is  placed 
accurately. 
At the other extreme, Russell Hardin has denied that it is an 
appropriate  attitude  for  citizens  to  take  toward  political 
actors and institutions [9]. He argues, from the position of 
rational  choice  theory,  that  citizens  will  never  be  in  an 
appropriate  epistemological  position  to  be  confident  that 
their  relations  of  trust  with  a  government  are  properly 
warranted. Given government is made up of hundreds of 
thousands  of  people  and  thousands  of  automatic  systems 
employed by hundreds of separate agencies, he argues that 
it is an impossible task. 
Clearly trust in Leviathan could not take the form of trust 
all the hundreds of thousands of employees; hence Hardin 
deduces that trust in government must be based, if at all, on 
the structure of incentives that the roles of these employees 
(and systems) deliver to them. Yet “few people can have an 
articulate  understanding  of  the  structures  of  various 
agencies  and  the  roles  within  them  or  of  the  overall 
government  to  be  confident  of  the  incentives  that  role-
holders have to be trustworthy” [9, p.30]. One might retain 
a confidence in the reliability of government, but reliance is 
not the same as trust [15]. 
This is surely too strong. In the first place, there are certain 
government actors for whom it is not unreasonable even on 
this account to say that (some) citizens might have trust. 
For instance, many voters take the trouble to watch their 
representatives, and sometimes other candidates, on TV, at 
public  meetings  or  even  door-to-door,  and  may  make 
judgments about them. Well-known political figures, such  
as Presidents, Prime Ministers and party leaders also come 
into this category. 
Secondly, citizens may make inferences about government 
employees, many of whom may have internalised rules and 
values  of  particular  organisations,  and  are  motivated  to 
follow  them.  A  citizen  with  experience  (or  even  just  an 
opinion)  of  a  government  department  might  be  able  to 
extrapolate  from  that  experience  or  opinion  to  the 
trustworthiness or otherwise of its agents. 
Thirdly, institutions (such as political parties, newspapers, 
well-known pundits or government departments) can certify 
the  trustworthiness  of  their  employees,  agents  or  other 
political  actors.  These  certifications  may  also  induce 
citizens to trust political actors. 
Fourthly,  many  actors  and  agencies  are  in  a  position  of 
authority with respect to a citizen. The whole question of 
the legitimacy of that authority, and the propensity of the 
citizen to resist, can easily be stated in terms of trust. That 
authority  is  something  in  which  the  citizen  comes  into 
contact  on  a  daily  basis,  and  so  is  acquainted  with  its 
vagaries. 
Finally,  in  many  cases  citizens  can  extrapolate  from 
attitudes  of  trust  toward  wider  communities  from  which 
political institutions draw their manpower. For instance, a 
lack of trust of those of a public school education may lead 
a  citizen  to  fail  to  trust  the  British  civil  service,  or  the 
Conservative  Party.  A  trust-based  preference  for  being 
governed by members of one’s own ethnic community may 
lead a citizen to advocate a federal structure in her nation. 
Hence even on Hardin’s view of the etiology of trust, it is 
not impossible that a citizen may trust in (some parts of) 
government or politics, and such trust or lack of it may be 
appropriate and warranted on many occasions. 
Three Theories of Trust 
Given that (and I think it is reasonable to take the wider 
view  that  people  can  and  do  form  trust  judgments  about 
government  agencies  and  political  actors  very  often, 
whether  warranted  or  not,  which  strongly  affect  their 
political  behaviour)  it  is  reasonable  to  go  on  to  consider 
what trust’s role in politics might be. In this paper, I shall 
consider three theories that are relevant to discussions about 
transparency and trust. 
First, there is the theory of  social capital [16, 6], which 
argues that trust is an expectation which arises from honest, 
regular and cooperative behaviour driven by communally-
shared norms. This expectation in turn drives many of the 
institutions of civil  society.  Putnam  has argued both  that 
Americans trust each other less because they have stopped 
bowling together [16], but also that they trust more because 
they  pray  together  [17],  which  is  perhaps  an  odd 
juxtaposition, but gives the flavour of the idea. Fukuyama 
argues that the spread of rights-based thinking in the US has 
undermined  social  capital  by  legitimising  and  protecting 
individualist behaviour at the expense of social norms [6]. 
One obvious issue here is that not all trust relationships are 
healthy for society [2] – for instance trust within a criminal 
gang.  The  question  for  social  capital  theorists  is  how  to 
ensure that trust relationships work toward the social good, 
and  thereby  to  reduce  the  incentives  for  hard-done-by 
individuals to assert and expand their rights. 
Second, there is the rational choice theory of encapsulated 
trust [10], in which the trustee acts in the trustor’s interests 
for reasons grounded in the trustor’s interests. The trustor 
must be sure that the trustee’s interests are aligned with his. 
The trustee must try to align her interests with those of the 
trustor. This might be done through institutions or contracts, 
or may merely be because the trustee will suffer loss if she 
does not. As a matter of fact, rational choice models of trust 
are psychologically very implausible, but in the world of 
politics,  a  public  space  characterised  by  conflict  where 
private reasons will not be persuasive, they have much to 
recommend  them.  An  important  issue  for  rational  choice 
theorists  is  how  to  avoid  coercion,  so  that  the  trustee’s 
adoption of the trustor’s interests is a free choice. 
Third, there is the idea of deliberative democracy [8, 4], 
which  advocates  the  resolution  of  conflict  via  engaged 
deliberation.  Parties  come  to  understand  each  other,  and 
partly  neutralise  conflict,  through  discussion  and  debate. 
Trust  here  plays  two  roles  [20]:  (i) allowing  highly 
politicised issues to be addressed because the parties’ trust 
of each other means that the negotiations can be made in 
good  faith  and  with  confidence  that  concessions  will  be 
rewarded,  and  promises  kept,  and  (ii) ensuring  that 
outcomes will have limited impact, and will not result in a 
hegemonic grab by the victor. 
Transparency and Trust 
The broad outlines of how transparency contributes to trust 
are probably already clear, even at the abstract level (I shall 
consider  a  detailed  example  below).  For  instance,  if  we 
begin with trust within rational choice theory, the trustee 
aligns her interests with those of the trustor. If the trustor is 
able to make an informed and accurate judgment about that 
alignment, then  he  will be able to place trust accurately. 
Transparency clearly has a role to play in this scenario, as it 
can  make  the  trustee’s  interests  absolutely  clear  [7]. The 
trustor is then able to check for any countervailing interests 
associated with the trustee, and can be more confident in his 
trust judgments. All things being equal, the more confident 
a trustor is in the trustworthiness of a trustee, the greater the 
risks he is prepared to take on her trustworthiness [14]. 
Similarly  from  the  angle  of  deliberative  democracy, 
transparency will help establish the interests of a would-be 
trustee,  and  enable  a  trustor  to  make  a  more  accurate 
estimate of whether she is negotiating or debating in good 
faith. As Luhmann argues [12, p.55], for trust to flourish in 
a  conflicted  political  situation  “a  minimum  of  real 
foundation  is  required.”  Transparency  provides  this,  
enabling a complex discussion to take place in which the 
trustor is fully confident – “in possession of enough reality 
to be able usually to opt out of [it]” [12, p.56]. 
This  also  enables  deliberative  democratic  institutions  to 
meet Baier’s expressibility test [2, pp.123-4], which argues 
that trust is morally acceptable when “knowledge of what 
the other party is relying on for the continuance of the trust 
relationship”  would  not  destabilise  that  relationship.  One 
way of ensuring that a trust relationship is not coercive is to 
be transparent about as many relevant matters as possible 
(subject to the obvious caveat in the political sphere that in 
a negotiation, each negotiator must keep a number of her 
cards face down). This point also shows how transparency 
can  add  the  missing  ethical  dimension  to  the 
neoconservative  view,  avoiding  the  unconditional 
valorisation of all relations of trust, and  instead enabling 
citizens to place trust in a more informed way. 
Transparency  would  certainly  undermine  many  trust 
relationships, by making clear when the trustee’s interests 
were  not  sufficiently  well-aligned  with  the  trustor’s,  or 
when she was not deliberating in good faith. However the 
trust  that  would  be  undermined  would  chiefly  be 
unwarranted trust. The replacement of unwarranted trust by 
distrust would have the paradoxical effect of opening up a 
space for warranted, and therefore more solidly-based and 
accurately-placed, trust [20]. 
Open Data and Trust 
Drilling  down  more  deeply,  how  does  open  data  online 
support  trust?  Broadly  speaking,  there  are  three  ways  in 
which trust in politics and across society can be enhanced. 
Note  the  importance  of  enhancing  rather  than  increasing 
trust:  the  point  is  that  trust  is  warranted  and  effectively 
placed, not merely more prevalent. 
First,  transparency  allows  the  citizen  to  see  what  the 
government  is  doing,  and  how  it  is  doing  it.  When 
procurement  processes  occur  in  public,  and  the  detail  of 
contracts  with  suppliers  are  available,  for  instance,  then 
there  is  far  more  information  upon  which  to  judge  the 
trustworthiness  of  the  procurement  process.  It  is  also 
important  for  citizens  to  be  aware  of  what  information 
exists that is not being released into the public domain (and 
the reasons for that). 
Second, open data increases the amount of information that 
is available to the citizen about her own community (e.g. 
crime  data,  food  inspection  data  or  data  about  local 
businesses  –  [1]).  This  allows  the  citizen  to  be  more 
confident  about  her  day-to-day  dealings,  and  be  more 
proactive in seeking out opportunities, collaborations and 
interactions. Her warranted trust of her fellow community 
members should rise, and help increase her appetite for risk. 
Her unwarranted trust should decrease, reducing the risks 
she takes. 
Third, open data increases the amount of data available for 
service  providers,  encouraging  the  development  of 
innovative  services  for  citizens  (and  consumers,  for  that 
matter).  The  result  will  be  a  wider  range  of  services 
available for citizens, which, by changing the incentives for 
service suppliers (who, for example, can no longer preserve 
monopolies  which  serve  producer  interests),  will  make  it 
more likely that citizens’ interests are aligned with service 
providers’ interests. 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  none  of  these  necessarily 
requires high take-up of open data by citizens in order to 
promote trust. The possibility of holding a government to 
account,  for  example,  is  the  important  thing,  rather  than 
there being an actual army of citizen auditors. Furthermore, 
there  are  often  interested  organisations  with  the  relevant 
expertise to represent concerned groups of citizens; trust in 
government  can  therefore  piggy-back  on  the  trust 
relationships between citizens and interest groups under a 
transparency regime. 
THE  UK  GOVERNMENT’S  TRANSPARENCY 
PROGRAMME 
As  a  concrete  example  of  a  transparency/open  data 
programme,  we  will  consider  that  of  the  UK 
Conservative/Liberal  Democrat  Coalition  government 
formed  after  the  General  Election  of  2010. The  previous 
(Labour) government had already set up many transparency 
institutions; the new government built on that beginning by 
expanding the transparency programme, writing it into the 
coalition  agreement.
2  That  agreement,  which  made  13 
commitments  to  transparency,  identified  government 
accountability, cutting public spending (and reducing the 
government’s financial deficit), economic growth and the 
provision of innovative services as important drivers in this 
space. Open data has also been seen as part of a ‘right to 
data’ for citizens, from the point of view that the legitimacy 
(and resources) of governments to collect data stem from 
citizens, who are therefore entitled to access to the same 
data.  The  coalition  agreement  was  expanded  with  more 
precise commitments set out in two letters from the Prime 
Minister to Cabinet Ministers on 29
th May 2010
3 and 7
th 
July 2011.
4 
The  transparency  programme  is  administered  from  t he 
Cabinet Office, and is advised by  a Transparency Board, 
made up of a number of expert advisors, and a  director of 
transparency policy. The website data.gov.uk hosts, at the 
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http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resource
s/coalition_programme_for_government.pdf 
3  http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/letter-to-government-
departments-on-opening-up-data/ 
4 http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/letter-to-cabinet-
ministers-on-transparency-and-open-data/  
time of writing, just under 8,000 datasets available for free 
download, without restriction (for use by UK and non-UK 
citizens alike). The datasets are made available on the Open 
Government  Licence
5  (OGL) developed by the National 
Archives based on models from Creative Commons. The 
OGL  is  non -restrictive,  allowing  copying,  publishing, 
distributing, adapting and commercially exploiting the data. 
The aim of this programme (and the several others that are 
being developed in the US, the EU and elsewhere) is to 
produce a new set of relations characterising the infosphere. 
The idea is to increase the richness and diversity of the 
information sources available to the citizen, as  Figure  1. 
There is obviously more complexity than appears in the 
figure, which has been deliberately simplified to  dramatise 
the  effect  of  transparency  and  open  data  on  citizens’ 
information supply. 
 
Figure 1: The Post Transparency Infosphere 
It is not expected that citizens will rush to download csv 
files  or  loads  of  RDF.  Instead,  the  new  world  is 
characterised by a new series of information suppliers or 
infomediaries  for  citizens,  who  are  able  to  mash  up 
information  from  various  sources  (not  only  from 
government) to create applications which deliver services 
(either  free  or  for  payment)  to  citizens,  and  provide 
alternative sources of information to the mass media. It may 
be that government information can be improved or added 
to by crowdsourcing. 
It should be emphasised that although a number of creative 
apps have been developed (see data.gov.uk for examples), 
the world pictured in Figure 1 remains an aspiration, and 
cannot  be  guaranteed  to  emerge.  Much  depends  on  the 
quality of the datasets being published by the government, 
on the appearance of an app development community, and 
not least on the trust that citizens have in the transparency 
programme itself. 
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government-licence/ 
EXAMPLE: DATA ON CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
In his letter of May 2011, the British Prime Minister set out 
his commitment for “crime data to be published at a level 
that  allows  the  public  to  see  what  is  happening  on  their 
streets from January 2011.” The result (actually launched 
on 1
st February) was the police.uk website,
6 which at the 
time of writing has had hundreds of millions of hits.  This 
presents the crime information on a map, but the underlying 
data is also separately available for app developers to reuse 
under the OGL. Cameron made more commitments in this 
sector in July 2011. 
  Sentencing  data  by  court  will  be  published  by 
November 2011, enabling the public to see exactly 
what  sentences  are  being  handed  down  in  their 
local  courts,  and  compare  different  courts  on  a 
wide  range  of  measures.  The  data,  anonymised, 
will include the age, gender and ethnicity of those 
sentenced, the sentence given, and the time taken 
at  each  stage  from  offence  to  completion  of  the 
case in court 
  Data  on  performance  of  probation  services  and 
prisons  including  re-offending  rates  by  offender 
and institution, to be published from October 2011 
  From  May  2012,  the  national  crime  mapping 
website,  Police.uk,  will  provide  the  public  with 
information  on  what  happens  next  for  crime 
occurring  on  their  streets,  i.e.  police  action  and 
justice outcomes. 
At  the  time  of  writing  (February  2012)  this  work  is 
proceeding to schedule. 
In this section, I wish to discuss some of the issues that the 
release of this data online has raised. I do not want to get 
into  the  details  of  the  data  releases  (which  raise  many 
technical  issues  to  do  with  data  management  and 
representation), but will focus on processes that may impact 
on public trust in the crime and criminal justice system in 
particular, and in government in general. 
The Post-Transparency Infosphere 
What does the infosphere now look like for the citizen who 
takes an interest in crime levels in her locale? If we ignore 
the raw data downloads, which only specialists will wish to 
see,  there  are  now  three  extra  levels  of  information  and 
informed commentary  which she  will be able to look at, 
over and above what was available before. 
First of all, there is police.uk, which is developed and run 
by (and for) the Home Office, and has a series of functions. 
Typing in one’s postcode gives access to the contact details 
and profiles of the neighbourhood policing team, details of 
the next local policing meeting, messages and Tweets from 
the local police force, and information on crime trends in 
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the  area.  The  site  provides  an  interactive  map  (albeit  a 
Google map of restricted copyright!) of the area showing 
the  crimes  that  occurred  during  the  most  recent  calendar 
month. The crimes are placed where they were located, but 
‘vagued up’, to ensure that each point on the map covers a 
minimum  of  8  postal  addresses  (to  protect  victims’ 
privacy). Maps from previous calendar months can also be 
accessed for comparison. 
Secondly,  there  are  local  websites,  often  created  by 
activists,  who are able to include the crime data  in their 
reporting  of  local  issues.  An  example  is  Kings  Cross 
Environment,
7  which reports on issues a round the Kings 
Cross area of London. Crime is not the only relevant issue, 
but in a busy inner city area it is clearly one important 
factor, and the authors of such sites are able to provide 
authentic, non-anecdotal detail. 
Thirdly, there are specific apps available which use crime 
data (often mashed up with other types of data). Examples 
from  data.gov.uk
8  include  Postcode  Research,  which 
presents at crime rates and school quality in a particular 
postcode for potential property purchasers , Walkonomics, 
which estimates how easy it is to walk on a street, mashing 
up crime data with more data on pavement quality, traffic, 
geography (particularly on the incline of the ground),  and 
crowdsourced  reviews,  and  Augmented  Crime  Scene, 
which presents images of crime scenes augmented with 
further information about the crime. Other apps re -present 
the official crime statistics to the user in different ways 
from the police.uk site (for example, allowing rankings or 
comparisons). 
The Alternatives 
There are, of course, alternatives to these particular points 
of access to crime data. The mass media remain in place, 
and  continue  to  provide  the  bulk  of  access  to  crime 
information  (transparency  and  open  data  are  unlikely  to 
change  that  in  the  short  to  medium  term).  There  is  a 
suspicion with some of the UK tabloid newspapers that the 
market imperatives to sell newspapers can affect the way 
that crime is presented. To express the issue baldly, if a 
newspaper’s business model depends on fostering a fear of 
crime, then it is hardly incentivised to report on crime in a 
balanced manner. Some reports have argued that “mistrust 
is exacerbated by the nature of some media reporting of the 
statistics” [19, pp.75-77]. The small number of mass media 
outlets  and  the  high  barriers  to  entry  should  lead  to 
concerns  about  the  low  level  of  competition  between 
information providers, and the decontextualisation of crime 
reporting. The contrast with the Web is powerful, as many 
sites  and  apps  integrate  crime  information  with  other 
information about the community to create a richer picture. 
                                                            
7 http://kingscrossenvironment.com/ 
8 See http://data.gov.uk/apps for a selection. 
A more liberal  approach to presenting crime information 
has been pursued in the US, where freedom of information 
and  free  speech  concerns  trump  priva cy  concerns.  For 
instance, as a result of Megan’s Law, information regarding 
registered  sex  offenders  must  be  supplied  to  the  public. 
Individual  states  have  some  discretion,  but  many  include 
photographs,  addresses  and  the  nature  of  the  crime 
committed.  Various  unofficial  websites  present  this 
information  on  interactive  maps.  It  has  been  argued  that 
such an approach has several unintended and undesirable 
consequences,  including  sometimes  the  targeting  of  sex 
offenders, although physical vigilantism is rare [11]; it has 
also been argued that the law is ineffective in preventing 
crime and represents poor value for money [21]. However 
that may be, communitarian philosophers have argued that 
the privacy rights that are  set aside by such laws should 
count for less than the health and welfare of communities 
[3]. It is unlikely that this type of approach will be attractive 
in Europe, given the difficulties of squaring it with Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
In short, it is fair to say that the position in the UK with 
respect  to  data  and  information  on  crime  and  criminal 
justice  stands  between  the  restrictive  position  which 
obtained prior to the election of the Coalition government 
in 2010, and the ultra-liberal position in the US. Broadly 
speaking, it is important to widen access to crime data for 
the purposes of fostering warranted trust. A report in 2010, 
for  instance,  found  that  trust  in  crime  statistics  is  not 
particularly high in the UK, and that many people think that 
the statistics are manipulated for political reasons [19]. 
Stakeholders and Issues 
Fostering trust is complicated by the fact that data about 
crime  and  criminal  justice  are  highly  sought-after  for  a 
large  number  of  reasons  by  a  highly  diverse  set  of 
constituencies.  For  instance,  interested  parties  include 
concerned citizens, the judiciary, the police, politicians and 
policymakers,  community  leaders,  community  activists, 
offenders’ organisations, victims and victim support groups, 
and  academics  studying  social  trends.  The  purposes  that 
crime and criminal justice data can serve are also manifold: 
improvements  in  the  justice  system,  building  warranted 
trust in the justice system, breaking down unwarranted trust 
(and unwarranted mistrust), improving policing and support 
for the police, increasing accountability for the courts and 
the police, and providing data for service providers to reuse. 
On the other hand, there are also legitimate concerns about 
data’s free flow. One issue is privacy; for instance, if the 
location of a crime (which is included in the data) coincides 
with  a  person’s  address,  then  that  person  is  thereby 
identified as the victim of the crime, and the data becomes 
personal  data.  The  creation  of  a  permanent  record  has 
caused some to worry about the possibility of reintegrating 
offenders  into  society.  In  British  law,  the  1974 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act states that an offender need 
not  disclose  relatively  minor  crimes  in  various  legal  
contexts after a period of time has elapsed without further 
offending.  Concerns  have  also  been  raised  about  the 
security of witnesses and victims. 
A  further,  rather  subtle,  consideration  arises  from 
Cameron’s  commitment  to  connect  crime  data  with 
criminal justice data. Technically, that is very hard to do, as 
the  information  systems  and  ontologies  used  by 
crimefighters and the criminal justice system are extremely 
different (they even fall under two separate ministries, the 
Home Office and the Ministry of Justice respectively). This 
makes  integration  very  hard.  Although  much  of  that  is 
simply an issue of poor system design, one reason for the 
separation  of  the  information  system  is  that  the  various 
branches of the crime and criminal justice system need to 
keep operational independence. The police, prosecutors and 
courts in particular need to  be prevented from colluding. 
So, for instance, once the police have made an arrest, their 
interest in the case is ended, apart from the need to present 
evidence to prosecutors, to the defence and in court. Their 
information systems therefore have no capacity to represent 
what happens in a crime after an arrest, and are focused on 
the  need  to  supply  relevant  evidence.  The  difficulties  of 
preventing  collusion  will  be  vastly  increased  if  the  three 
branches of the system use a single information system. 
There are also issues about capturing important context for 
crime data. As one example, the reason that offender A got 
a  more  severe  sentence  than  offender  B  might  be  quite 
complex and hard to represent in simple terms (for instance, 
on a crime  map). As another example, confidence  in the 
criminal  justice  system  might  be  undermined  if  citizens 
expect  the  police  to  identify  the  offender  for  a  large 
majority of crimes, or to prosecute a large majority of the 
offenders they identify. Neither of these expectations will 
be justified by the data, and in the second case at least there 
are  often  good  public  policy  reasons  why  this  does  not 
happen. 
Another  policy  consideration  is  that  the  publication  of 
crime data might undermine the data itself. There are two 
hypothetical reasons for this. First, a crime victim might not 
report a crime for privacy reasons – he or she might simply 
not  wish to see the crime appear on a publicly available 
map. Second, there are worries that property or insurance 
prices could be adversely affected if the extent of crime in 
that district was revealed (logically, of course, this could 
also lead to rises in prices in areas that had low crime), and 
so again victims might be reluctant to report. In either case, 
the crime maps would underrepresent crime. It should be 
emphasised  that  currently  there  is  no  empirical  evidence 
that either of these two effects has occurred. 
It is clear from the diversity of the stakeholder set, and the 
arguments for releasing and withholding the data, that the 
data  releases  are  highly  complex  politically  (as  well  as 
technically), and will impact on public trust. To that end, 
the  next  three  sections  will  briefly  consider  how  trust  is 
likely to be fostered by the transparency programme from 
the point of view, in turn, of the three theories of political 
trust set out above. 
TRUST AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The  key  issue  for  social  capital  theorists  is  that  trust 
propagates  within  and  across  civil  associations  and  civil 
society  independent  of  government.  As  community  sites 
such  as  Kings  Cross  Environment  show,  data  about 
communities (including but certainly not limited to crime 
data) can help foster meaningful relations between people 
sharing  a  real-world  space.  The  data  that  enables  the 
construction of meaningful narratives about a community 
plays an important role in developing trust, in three ways. 
First,  the  narrative  is  an  important  tool  in  dealings  with 
authorities. Data is vital for enabling civil associations to 
challenge  local  and  national  government.  For  example, 
genuine data about a rise in crime in a particular area is 
much more compelling than perceptions of a rise. 
Second,  the  actions  within  the  community  also  become 
more  transparent,  and  the  interests  of  actors  clearer.  The 
sponsorships of a local firm, for example, can be weighed 
against the services it provides for local government (and 
the payments it receives). 
Third,  the  available  data  enables  cooperation  between 
actors, providing raw material for example for prioritisation 
of  actions,  construction  of  realistic  goals  and  objective 
measurement  of  outcomes.  All  these  make  cooperation 
more effective. 
Seen from the social capital point of view, open data and 
transparency  provide  valuable  input  to  civil  associations, 
and by reducing information asymmetries help them assert 
their interests  against  government, large corporations and 
mass  media  interests.  Barriers  to  cooperation  within 
associations  are  also  broken  down  by  transparency  and 
open data. 
TRUST AND RATIONAL CHOICE 
The  impetus  behind  transparency  has  largely  been  on 
rational  choice  grounds,  as  the  history  described  by  [7] 
reveals, enabling potential trustors to determine the interests 
of would-be trustees, diminishing the role of unwarranted 
trust and enabling and encouraging warranted trust. To this 
extent, the rational choice elements of  trust focus  on the 
basic issue of trust of the government by the citizen. The 
focus  by  members  of  the  Coalition  government  on 
accountability  tends  to  imply  the  same  thing.  This  is 
perhaps the most obvious application of transparency and 
open data. 
Within the crime and criminal justice sector, one driver is 
accountability of the police, a long-term aim of UK policy. 
Trust  depends  on  genuine  accountability,  and  therefore 
avenues  for  citizens  to  effect  change.  In  the  case  of  the 
police, it is clear that more information is only part of that 
story; other institutions are needed, and the government is 
introducing  directly-elected  Police  and  Crime  
Commissioners to put citizens’ concerns into action.
9 There 
is some scepticism about the likely value of this move, but 
the point for our purposes is that trust depends on the ability 
to identify weaknesses and failures (which the Web can 
provide) in tandem with the ability to effect change, which 
requires new institutions. 
TRUST AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
The issue for rational choice theorists is that trust requires 
not  just  information  but  also  a  measure  of  power.  For 
deliberative democracy, the picture is less stark, but the role 
of the Web needs to be located within a subtler picture in 
which  the  ability  to  effect  change  (such  as  voting  for 
Commissioners  every  four  years)  is  less  important  than 
involvement and engagement. Hence as with rational choice 
theories,  deliberative  democracy  depends  on  information 
freely  available  from  the  Web  as  a  necessary,  but  not  a 
sufficient,  condition  for  generating  trust.  It  also  requires 
carefully-designed  means  by  which  relevant  stakeholders 
can  feed  into  the  discussion  process  in  order  both  to 
influence  proceedings  and  to  come  to  understand  the 
concerns and constraints on other parties. In this section, I 
shall  discuss  one  approach  to  this  issue  which  is  being 
pioneered in the United Kingdom. 
Transparency, Good Faith and Inclusion 
The  current  UK  transparency  regime  is  somewhat  top-
down, and as I have argued elsewhere [13] needs to (and 
probably  will)  become  more  responsive  to  demand. 
However, the data most in demand quite often is the most 
sensitive  data,  particularly  with  respect  to  crime  and 
criminal justice, and so screening is also important. Given 
the range of stakeholders in this sector, fostering trust in all 
relevant  communities  will  be  a  complex  matter.  In 
particular, there is a danger that the debate is interpreted as 
a zero-sum game, where someone who wants the data is 
pitted  directly  against  someone  who  wants  to  keep  it 
concealed.  Although  it  will  sometimes  come  down  to 
exactly that position, more likely there will be a nuanced 
compromise  available  (for  instance,  the  data  might  be 
aggregated to preserve personal privacy while still allowing 
a rich picture of a community to be presented). 
By parity of argument, trust in transparency makes similar 
demands  to  trust  in  politics.  Or,  put  another  way, 
transparency can only support warranted trust in an area of 
politics if the transparency programme itself is trusted. In 
short, if transparency is to foster trust, then the transparency 
programme  itself  should  be  transparent.  Furthermore,  it 
needs  to  be  structured  so  that  as  many  of  the  interests 
                                                            
9 See 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police/police-
commissioners-protocol?view=Binary for the protocol for 
this new position. 
highlighted above  as possible  are represented and able to 
put their case [13]. 
The Transparency Sector Panel for Crime and Criminal 
Justice 
To that end, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice 
have set up a transparency sector panel which is intended to 
advise and challenge the strategy group of officials tasked 
with  delivering  the  government’s  transparency 
commitments in the sector of crime and criminal justice. 
The panel is based on a model developed in [13], which is 
designed to broaden discussion about what it is appropriate 
to release. It should be noted that the transparency sector 
panel  is  not  an  example  of  government  policy,  and  was 
specifically  developed  for  the  crime  and  criminal  justice 
sector by the two ministries concerned. 
In  general,  the  main  discussions  relating  to  trust  and 
transparency  (e.g.  about  whether  a  data  release  would 
threaten privacy) tend to be discussed with lawyers, with an 
eye to remaining compliant with data protection rules. [13] 
argues  that  (a) data  protection  is  not  sufficient  for 
preserving privacy, or public trust, or indeed the usability of 
data,  and  (b) the  right  discussions  should  be  more  wide-
ranging, including not only lawyers but also representatives 
of all interested parties in the domain, those demanding the 
data,  the  data  controllers  (who  undertake  the  risks  of 
publication), domain experts (who know about the power of 
data in that domain, and the potential harms), and technical 
experts.  In  such  a  debate,  the  various  stakeholder 
representatives  can  be  seen  by  individual  citizens  as 
defending relevant interests,  while the advisory nature of 
the panel means that no coterie of its members has a veto 
over  transparency  as  a  whole.
10  Examples of the issues 
addressed within the panel include the issue of whether to 
name offenders in giving out sentence data, the ex tremely 
patchy  provision  of  information  to  court  reporters  by 
different courts, and the impact of the riots of Autumn 2011 
across the UK on the transparency programme. 
Given the transparency of the  sector panel’s proceedings,
11 
the trustworthiness and good faith (or otherwise) of the 
deliberations  is  demonstrable.  Furthermore,  given  the 
access that key interest groups gain to the relevant officials 
                                                            
10 At the time of writing, the panel contains 4 transparency 
activists,  an  academic  expert  on  geodata,  and 
representatives of the Association of Chief Police Officers, 
the  Information  Commissioner’s  Office,  Nacro  (formerly 
the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of 
Offenders),  Victim  Support,  the  Victim’s  Commissioner, 
and the Office of the Senior Presiding Judge, together with 
relevant officials tasked with delivering transparency. The 
author of the present article is the current chair. 
11  The  minutes  are  posted  on  
http://data.gov.uk/blogs/leadership.  
by this device, the transparency programme itself is more 
responsive to the external demand for information. Finally, 
it is hoped that the deliberations between participants and 
with the government officials will themselves foster trust 
across  the  sector,  by  enlarging  the  perspectives  of 
participants, dispelling narratives of betrayal or bad faith, 
allowing apparently compromised positions to be justified, 
and  simply  by  encouraging  dialogue.  All  this  is  in 
accordance with theories connecting trust and deliberative 
democracy [8, 20, pp.338-340]. 
DISCUSSION: TRANSPARENCY AND TRUST 
The  UK’s  transparency  programme  has  been  a  central 
policy of the Coalition government. As discussed earlier, it 
has  been  driven  by  several  agendas,  but  increasing 
trustworthiness and trust in government has been implicit 
all  along.  Part  of  the  context  of  the  programme  was  the 
disastrous  expenses  scandal  of  2009  amongst  British 
Parliamentarians, which diminished public trust in politics 
dramatically. Not only did it have that unfortunate effect, 
but it also tarnished the previous transparency regime based 
on the Freedom of Information Act 2000; the FoI request 
about MPs’ expenses was originally made in 2005, taken up 
by  the  Information  Commissioner  in  2007,  and  only 
implemented in 2009. Even then, the information officially 
released  was  redacted  to  remove  key  information  about 
second homes; it was an unofficial leak of the information 
by a newspaper which revealed the extent of the abuse. 
It  is  intriguing  that,  depending  upon  one’s  favourite 
democratic theory and theory of trust, the transparency and 
open data programmes can support three different types of 
trust. Institutions such as the transparency sector panel for 
crime and criminal justice can help foster warranted trust 
among political actors and representatives of interest groups 
(and then secondarily to the supporters of such groups). On 
a social capital point of view,  warranted trust is fostered 
among civil associations. From a rational choice point of 
view,  citizens’  trust  in  government  can  be  strengthened, 
where it is appropriate. 
Given  these  results,  transparency  and  open  data  are 
important  additions  to  the  democratic  toolbox.  Clearly, 
open  data  worldwide  is  at  an  early  stage  –  the 
transformation of the infosphere is at a very early stage, and 
it still remains to create  the collections of infomediaries, 
both  commercial  and  non-profit,  that  will  animate  the 
philosophy  and  deliver  a  genuinely  wide  range  of 
information sources and innovative services. 
The  considerations  above  suggest  lessons  that  can  be 
learned for transparency and open data programmes from 
the point of view of fostering warranted trust. The headline 
message is that publishing data is not enough. Change at 
the level of institutions and processes is also required. 
First of all, the publication of data on the Web affects a 
number  of  stakeholders  (we  saw  from  the  crime  and 
criminal justice example how wide a set of interests these 
may be). Conflicting interests may set the tone for several 
technical debates about representation of data; for instance, 
community activists tend to want fine-grained data, while 
privacy activists would prefer aggregation – yet the patterns 
that the former are interested in might be invisible at higher 
levels of aggregation. Involvement of all interest groups is 
important at all levels of work, including technical aspects. 
Second,  consulting  those  demanding  the  data  will  ensure 
that the data released are those most meaningful to users. 
Conversely, the top down approach, where the data released 
is decided by central government without consultation, will 
tend to fail to address the concerns of users. Furthermore, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  risk  management,  there  is  an 
important  moral  hazard  here.  Those  ‘transparency  tsars’ 
pushing  for data releases do not control a  single  byte of 
data, while the data controllers themselves take the risks of 
data releases; it is the data controller who will be hauled up 
before  the  Information  Commissioner  in  the  event  of  a 
breach of data protection law. This is one reason why the 
Association of Chief Police Officers, representing the Chief 
Constables of the UK’s 43 police forces (the controllers of 
crime data), is represented on the sector panel for crime and 
criminal justice. 
Third,  the  data  released  should  be  meaningful  for 
communities and citizens. Big data crunchers will of course 
welcome  the  increase  in  available  data,  but  on  the  other 
hand if datasets (a) are released according to an agenda set 
by big corporations, or (b) are tailored to their needs rather 
than  those  of  citizens  (for  example,  if  personal  data  is 
routinely  shared  with  corporations  without  meaningful 
consent  given  by  data  subjects,  especially  in  sensitive 
sectors such as health or education), it will quickly become 
clear  to  citizens  that  it  is  they  who  are  becoming 
transparent,  not  the  government.  Similarly,  the  OGL  and 
sites such as data.gov.uk should be central for the delivery 
architecture, rather than charging fees or granting exclusive 
licences, which will raise rather than lower the barriers to 
entry. 
Fourth, all theories of political trust require the dismantling 
of  information  asymmetries.  In  particular,  Schoeman  has 
argued  that  civil  associations  require  privacy  in  order  to 
function [18]. It follows that information about government 
function needs to be released, and citizens’ privacy needs to 
be treated with great respect. Of course there are situations 
where knowing how  government  has  functioned involves 
knowing  about  individuals  (for  example  the  quality  of  a 
school is defined by the performance of its pupils). In such 
cases, there are complex issues to be negotiated [13]. It is 
essential to do this in good faith. 
Fifth, in order for citizens to judge that debate is carried out 
in good faith, it is important for the transparency process 
itself to be transparent [13]. It is important to know which 
datasets have been selected for publication and which not, 
and in the latter case why not.  
Finally,  the  arguments  in  this  paper  have  been  largely 
theoretical,  as  have  the  political  and  the  economic 
arguments  for  transparency  and  open  data  as  a  whole. 
Empirical  data  are  needed,  about  citizens’  trust  of  such 
programmes,  about  the  economic  benefits  and  costs,  and 
also about related matters (such as the effect of publishing 
crime data on property prices). Empirical investigation will 
enable  a  more  finely-attuned  set  of  transparency  policies 
and information releases to be developed. 
As noted, these are important for fostering warranted trust; 
they will not necessarily help with respect to other drivers, 
such as growth or cost-cutting. But as a final lesson, it is 
worth pointing out that the legitimacy of any transparency 
programme depends on public trust [13]. In that sense, trust 
underpins any other purpose to which transparency may be 
put. From that point of view, the lessons listed above are 
fundamental. 
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